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In recent years, many traditional practitioners of revenue management such as airlines or hotels were con-
fronted with aggressive low-cost competition. In order to stay competitive, these ﬁrms responded by reducing
fare restrictions that were originally meant to fence oﬀ customer segments. In markets where traditional
practitioners faced low-cost competition, unrestricted fares were introduced. Some markets, including airline
long-haul markets, were unaﬀected. And here restrictions could be maintained.
We develop choice-based network revenue management approaches for such a mixed fare environment
that can handle both the traditional opening or closing of restricted fare classes as well as handling pricing
of the unrestricted fares simultaneously. Due to technical constraints of the reservation system, we have a
limit on the number of price points for each unrestricted fare. It is natural to ask then how these price points
shall be chosen. To that end, we formulate the problem as a dynamic program and approximate it with a
mixed integer linear program (MIP) that selects the best price points out of a potentially large set of price
candidates for each unrestricted fare.
Numerical experiments illustrate the quality of the obtained price structure and that computational eﬀort
is relatively low given that we need to tackle the large-scale MIP with column generation techniques.
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1. Introduction
Revenue Management (RM) is rooted in the airline industry, where it emerged in the mid 1980’s
as an impressively eﬀective means to fend oﬀ the low-cost carriers that entered the US market
after its deregulation. Driven by these successful implementations, many other industries, such
as hotel chains, car rentals or trains (just to name a few), adopted RM practices. The idea was
based on eﬀective customer segmentation according to price sensitivity, enabling the ﬁrm to oﬀer
competitive rates while minimizing cannibalization of sales to less price-sensitive customers. This
segmentation occurs as a result of companies’ imposing restrictions on discounted tariﬀs. For exam-
ple, airlines and hotels use minimum length of stay restrictions, mandatory Saturday-night stays,
advanced booking requirements or age-based discounts. However, in recent years an increasing
number of ﬁrms successfully implemented low-cost business strategies that operate without the
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complicated tariﬀ structure that combines discounted products with restrictions. Prominent exam-
ples are Ryanair or businesses of the easyGroup who advance this concept in many industries,
such as airline (easyJet), bus (easyBus) and many more. By advertising unfavorable comparisons
between their own tariﬀs and the ones of the incumbents, many of the latter felt the need to
oﬀer at least some unrestricted products in order to counter the negative impressions created by
such campaigns. Currently we observe this trend most particularly in the airline business, where
traditional carriers such as Lufthansa or British Airways experiment with oﬀering both restricted
and unrestricted fares. It also begins to manifest in other areas, such as the example of easyGroup
with their cross-sectoral restriction-free approach shows. It is thereﬁre likely that we will frequently
face similar topics like the one on the agenda for the practitioner conference “eyefortravel Travel
Distribution Summit Europe” in 2005: “The rise of the ‘no frills’ hotel. Could this have the same
eﬀect on the hospitality industry as low-cost carriers had on the airline sector?”.
The consequence of this development for the RM of incumbent ﬁrms who respond to this aggres-
sive competition by oﬀering a mix of restricted and unrestricted products is the partial invalidation
of the premises for customer segmentation, although there is still a substantial part of the mar-
ket where the segmentation works well. However, current RM systems build upon the traditional
assumptions of oﬀering only restricted products, and thus, there is a need for research in the
realm of mixed restriction and restriction-free fares, as illustrated by the recent practitioner article
by Vinod (2006). Despite these appeals from the practitioners facing these issues, little academic
research has been carried out to date in the context of mixed fare environments.
In the following, for the sake of illustration, we will present our approach in the airline context
and use airline terminology, but the ideas can transfer with few adjustments to other industries
that use multiple resources in their products as well. For example, transfer to the hotel industry is
done by exchanging ﬂight legs with room nights, that means, an itinerary with multiple ﬂight legs
becomes a stay over multiple nights, and so on.
We propose in this paper a revenue maximizing framework tailored to this new fare environment,
in particular, the sets of productsthat diﬀerent customer segments consider for purchase are allowed
to overlap. More speciﬁcally, the model distinguishes between unrestricted and restricted fares,
incorporates a ﬁnite set of price points (obtained by a preprocessing method) for each unrestricted
fare, and leads to customer choice-based policies by providing opportunity cost estimates. Modeling
customer choice is of great importance, particularly since unrestricted fares can be considered for
purchase by diﬀerent segments, given that the restrictions meant to fence low fares oﬀ have been
removed. A choice model suited to this task is the Multinomial Logit (MNL) with overlappingMeissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 3
consideration sets, see Miranda Bront et al. (2009), for example. Some modiﬁcations allow us to
use their approach to tackle the problem at hand. We pursue the following main research issues:
• What network revenue management optimization approach can handle both traditional and
unrestricted demand such that it selects which fares to oﬀer and, for the unrestricted ones, at what
price?
• How to pre-select price points for the unrestricted products, given that booking systems are
often limited in the number of price points they can manage, and that it might not be possible to
change the available price points during the booking horizon?
• What is the worth of an additional price point?
Our contribution lies within providing answers to these issues. We ﬁrst propose a choice-based
RM model from which control policies can be derived that work in mixed fare environments. This
model uses a ﬁnite set of price points for each unrestricted fare and treats each price point as a
separate, “virtual” fare. At any point in time, at most one such virtual fare may be oﬀered for each
unrestricted fare. Since the ability of booking systems to handle many fares is limited, the question
arises of which price points shall be used. To this end, we contribute to developing a dynamic
programming model that represents the optimal policy in both selecting the best price points and
in controlling which set of products to oﬀer at any point in time. It is of theoretical interest only
due to the curse of dimensionality, but yields insights into pricing in this context, namely that
the later one commits to price points the better. In order to approximate this intractable dynamic
program, we develop a mixed integer linear program that provides us with a good feasible pricing
structure that can even be optimal, as illustrated by the numerical experiments. As a by-product,
we obtain the upper bounds on the value of having an additional price point by means of the
optimal dual solution of the linear programming relaxation, which is again an interesting feature
in testing fare structures.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy review the related literature,
then we present the modeling framework in Section 3 followed by the mixed fare environment
optimization model given ﬁxed prices in Section 4. The related question of how to pre-select price
points is discussed in Section 5, including presentation of the underlying dynamic program and the
linear mixed integer program approximation. Numerical evidence for the performance of the price
point pre-selection is provided in Section 5.3 before we conclude in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
Naturally, the ﬁrst to identify the changes necessary in revenue management optimization with
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airlines, software providers and pricing consultancies have appeared since 2003 that analyze the
changes in the business environment due to low cost competition. Academia followed with some
delay in providing potential answers to the outlined questions.
Let us ﬁrst turn to the practitioner reports to frame the problem. Among the ﬁrst was Foran
(2003) from British Airways, describing their dramatic cut of restrictions at the time to simplify
their fare structure. Many traditional airlines had very reﬁned market segmentations in place so
that many network products ended up almost never being purchased. British Airways decided
to simplify fares, thereby accepting a loss of ability to segment because the high fare complexity
oﬀset potential customers. This customer behavior was also stressed by Cary (2004) who further
added that business customers have become unusually price-sensitive, as compared to the nineties.
Low cost competition on the short-haul links undermined the traditional carriers’ ability to price
discriminate, as noted by Tretheway (2004), owing to the introduction of cheap one-way fares.
Many other companies followed suit in cutting restrictions, for example, the United Kingdom’s
GNER and Virgin Trains in 2005. While some ﬁrms such as bmi even replaced their whole revenue
management system with a one-way fare structure (see Donnelly et al. 2004), most others chose to
introduce low-cost fares along with the traditional ones.
Westermann (2005) stressed that often unrestricted fare structures need only to be introduced
on links facing low cost competition. In other markets, in particular connecting traﬃc, traditional
methods are still working well and should be kept since unrestricted fares usually lead to revenue
dilution. The resulting mix of restricted and unrestricted products is a major challenge and should
be addressed by the optimization module in an Origin-Destination (O&D) mechanism, because
markets where undiﬀerentiated fare structures are being used can be identiﬁed by their O&D as
Westermann (2005) pointed out. He partitions airlines into four groups with respect to their fare
structure and outlines which type of RM approach is appropriate for each individual group. There
is (1) the low-cost business model that uses restriction-free prices over the whole network, (2)
network carriers that introduced undiﬀerentiated fare structures without being able to diﬀerentiate
them from traditional markets because they use leg-based methods, (3) network carriers that did
not change their model completely in markets with low-cost competition but that rather just
introduced a few booking classes, and ﬁnally (4) network carriers that use O&D control and who
consequently can distinguish diﬀerentiated from undiﬀerentiated demand.
The underlying problems of a mixed restricted / unrestricted fare approach are touched on in
the AGIFORS presentation of Weber and Thiel (2004) from Lufthansa Systems. They speak of
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more but also decision variables. However, they do not provide details of a solution approach.
Models of customer choice become important in the presence of solely price-orientated customers
as illustrated by Boyd and Kallesen (2004). They observed that customers tend to ignore fare
restrictions and focus mostly on price, such that demand is realized at the lowest available fare.
The credit crunch in 2008 and the subsequent economic downturn further aggravate this situation
in that demand for premium and business fares has broken down. For illustration, in February 2009
demand for such productsdroppedby 21% relative to the same month the year before, as announced
by IATA (2009). Though there is still demand which can be addressed by traditional means, a
ﬁrm must be aware of this mix of demand types and adjust their forecasting and optimization
systems accordingly, favorably in an O&D model since customer choice is best being modeled in
this context. Ratliﬀ and Vinod (2005) and Vinod (2006) identify the issue of optimizing in a mixed
fare environment as future important problems.
From an academic perspective, not much work has been done yet to address this problem. Eﬀects
of the entry of a low-cost carrier into a subset of a network of traditional airlines were studied
by Gorin and Belobaba (2004) with the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator. They pursue the
question of if RM would become superﬂuous in a restriction-free pricing context and ﬁnd that
the opposite is the case: RM becomes even more important for both the low-cost entrant as well
as for the established carriers. Competitive pressure arises on the most important point-to-point
short-haul routes, and as it is intuitively clear, network RM becomes increasingly important for
the incumbent airlines in order to favorably trade oﬀ between connecting and local passengers.
They do not consider the possibility of oﬀering both restriction-free fares as well as traditional
ones. Instead, three situations are investigated: a no low fare competition, an attacking entrant
with a two-tier fare structure and with the incumbent airlines matching the price of the lowest
open fare (the one which is most restricted) in aﬀected markets and, ﬁnally, the incumbent airlines
fully match the low fare structure on the aﬀected markets. One of the main ﬁndings was that O&D
controls are very robust to changes in the competitive environment as compared to leg-level RM.
Such an O&D optimization method was presented at AGIFORS by Fiig et al. (2005) as an exten-
sion of the well-known displacement-adjusted virtual nesting (DAVN), and was labeled DAVN-MR.
They proposed to split demand into dependent and independent demand, and then to transform
dependent demand into independent demand. This would be fed into a linear program that returns
displacement costs. Fares are adjusted by subtracting displacement costs to account for the cost
of committing capacity, and, in addition, by subtracting price elasticity costs that reﬂect risk of
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(EMSR) method. An interesting approach was presented more recently by Gallego et al. (2007)
who built their model on DAVN-MR but also included buy-up by using the multinomial-logit choice
model, and Gallego et al. (2009), who focus on the static single-leg RM problem. Their work is
somewhat related to ours in that they also use the MNL model to address both restricted and
unrestricted airfare conditions. However, we investigate dynamic multi-period network problems,
and, furthermore, focus on how to optimize the pricing structure of the unrestricted fares. Our
model is based on the work of Miranda Bront et al. (2009), who a consider choice-based network
RM approach for the MNL model with overlapping segment consideration sets, meaning there may
be products that are considered for purchase by more than one customer segment. This feature is
exploited in our work to depict choice in mixed fare environments. Meissner and Strauss (2009)
recently extended other RM approaches to allow for overlapping consideration sets and we note
that the model developed in this paper can be based on these approaches as well. As our intent is to
highlight ways to optimize the pricing structure in mixed fare environments, we conﬁne ourselves
to the simpler model of Miranda Bront et al. (2009). The essential ideas would remain the same,
as only the policy performance can be expected to be better at the cost of signiﬁcantly higher
computational requirements.
3. The Modelling Framework
In this section, we present our ideas of how the above described situation of a mixed fare environ-
ment can be modeled. We will focus on the example of an airline network for the sake of simplicity.
In general, our model admits both restricted and/or unrestricted fares on each ﬂight leg or on
their combinations. For airline application, the practitioner reports Boyd and Kallesen (2004) and
Vinod (2006) suggest that on each ﬂight leg of a traditional carrier that competes with a low cost
carrier on a particular leg, the former typically has a fare structure similar to an unrestricted one.
For connecting ﬂights, however, demand is little aﬀected so that restrictions can be maintained.
Thus, the examples given in this article assume that direct ﬂights are only oﬀered as an unre-
stricted fare whose price we control, and restricted fares on connecting ﬂights where we control fare
availability. Further, we assume that connecting ﬂights cannot be substituted by buying tickets
for its several ﬂight legs separately. However, our model also admits any mix of restricted and
unrestricted fares for any itinerary; the assumption above is not restrictive and is only made for
the sake of a clearer presentation.
The notation of our model in the network case is geared to the network RM model of Liu and
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Product
We consider a network consisting of m resources, for example ﬂight legs in the airline application.
Each resource i has a ﬁxed capacity of ci, and the network capacity is given by the corresponding
vector c=[c1,...,cm]T. The capacity is homogenous, i.e. all seats are perfectly substitutable and do
not diﬀer, hence allowing us to accommodate all kinds of requests from the given general capacity
on a given ﬂight leg. We need to ﬁnd a common ground for the availability and pricing control,
respectively, and achieve this by treating every possible price for the unrestricted fare on a given
point-to-point ﬂight i as a separate product. Hence, for each point-to-point ﬂight i there is a set
of unrestricted “virtual fare products” Ui, each such product j ∈Ui in lieu for a speciﬁc price out
of a discrete price set. The entity of virtual fare products is denoted by U :=
S
iUi. In practice, we
can obtain the set Ui of price points for some unrestricted fare i by ﬁrst deﬁning a price interval
according to strategic considerations.This price range we partition into a (potentially large) number
of prices with equal distance to each other, and deﬁne Ui to represent all the resulting price points.
Note that the booking system does not need to deal with all these price points since we propose a
method to pre-select prices from these candidates in an oﬀ-line procedure.
A restricted product consists of a seat on one or several ﬂight legs in combination with a fare
class and departure date. The set of restricted products is denoted by R, accordingly N := R∪U
is the set of all n = |N| products in the network. Every product j ∈ N has an associated revenue
rj. By deﬁning aij = 1 if resource i is used by product j, and aij = 0 otherwise, we obtain the
incidence matrix A = (aij) ∈ {0,1}m×n whose columns shall be denoted by Aj. Each column Aj
gives us information about which resources product j uses. Accordingly we write i∈Aj if resource
i is being used by product j. The state of the system is given by the vector of unused capacity
x = [x1,...,xm]T, and selling product j changes x to x − Aj. Deﬁning A to be a binary matrix
entails the implicit assumption that no group requests are allowed. We emphasize that allowing
aij > 1 does not change the analysis. Therefore, it is straightforward to include group requests in
our model.
Customers and Choice Model
Customers arrive at random in the system (for example, on the website), subsequently decide what
product to purchase depending on the available alternatives, or potentially do not buy at all. The
(non-)purchase decision is made on the basis of a choice model that we explain in the following
paragraph.
There are L customer segments in total, and each segment l ∈{1,...,L} has a certain set Cl ⊂ N
of products that they consider for purchase. For all products j ∈ Cl, customers of this segment8 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
have a preference value vlj. These values are derived by means of a random utility model. For an
introduction, see Section 7.2.2 in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004).
We assume that customers choose according to the Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model,
which is very popular in practical applications because it is easy to use and very ﬂexible. A
particular advantage is that we can allow consideration sets to overlap, reﬂecting the lacking means
of segmentation. Furthermore, we can adjust preferences for products according to the extent that
restrictions are being imposed on them, and any other attribute aﬀecting customers’ perceived
utility. On the downside, note that we need to estimate preference values for all price points for
unrestricted fares, including those that might have never been oﬀered before. To that end, we refer
to the literature on calibrating the MNL model, for example, the recent work of Ratliﬀ et al. (2008)
or Vulcano et al. (2008).
The booking horizon is divided into T periods that are small enough such that there is at most
one customer arrival according to a time-homogeneous Poisson process with arrival rate λ. Time-
varying arrivals can also be captured by our models in that we ﬁrst partition the time horizon
into subintervals on which arrivals can be assumed time-homogenous, and then carry out the same
analysis for each subinterval. Decisions on which products to oﬀer must be made at the beginning
of each time period.
Since the consideration sets overlap, the ﬁrm cannot distinguish with certainty between diﬀerent
segments. Therefore, we can only attach a probability pl,
P
lpl = 1, to the event that a customer
belongs to segment l. We deﬁne Poisson processes with rate λl := plλ for every segment, so that
λ =
P
lλl. The probability that a segment l customer purchases product j when the fare set S is
oﬀered is given by
Plj(S)=
vlj P
ι∈Cl∩S vlι +vl0
for S ⊂ N,|S ∩Ui|≤1,∀i,
where vl0 is the preference for not buying anything. We remark that the latter quantity vl0 can
also be used to include the inﬂuence of competition on the decision in that it may reﬂect the
attractiveness of competitive products. The condition |S ∩ Ui| ≤ 1 for all direct ﬂights i means
that at most one price for the unrestricted fare can be oﬀered at a time. A major advantage of
this model is that every restricted or unrestricted fare, which is considered by some segment l,
can be compared to the others in consideration set Cl, and intuitive probabilities can be derived
that reﬂect preferences and oﬀer set. That is, the segment’s preference vector essentially has the
function of shifting the purchase probabilities according to the oﬀered set of fares.
Finally, the purchase probability for product j given the arrival of a customer is deﬁned by
Pj(S)=
L X
l=1
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4. Optimize Price Values Given Price Levels
In this section, we derive control policies that can be used in a mixed fare environment given a
ﬁnite set of ﬁxed price points for each unrestricted fare. We begin with stating the optimal policy
in terms of a dynamic programming formulation. Given a set Ui of ﬁxed price levels for each
unrestricted fare i, we wish to maximize expected revenue from a sales process over the entire
booking horizon by oﬀering the optimal mix of restricted products and unrestricted fares at a price
out of Ui for each ﬂight i. This problem can be formulated as the following dynamic program,
where Vt(x) denotes the expected revenue from having uncommitted network capacity vector x at
time t:
Vt(x)= max
S⊂N(x):|S∩Ui|≤1,∀i
X
j∈S
λPj(S)
h
fj +Vt+1(x−Aj)
i
+
h
1−λ+λP0(S)
i
Vt+1(x)
= max
S⊂N(x):|S∩Ui|≤1,∀i
￿X
j∈S
λPj(S)
h
fj −
￿
Vt+1(x)−Vt+1(x−Aj)
￿i￿
+Vt+1(x), ∀t,x.
The boundary conditions are given by Vτ+1(x)=0 for all inventory states x, and N(x):={j ∈ N :
x ≥ Aj} denotes the collection of all feasible oﬀer sets. Theoretically, it is possible to solve this
problem via backward dynamic programming, but the size of the state space makes it intractable
for practical implementation. Thus we need computationally attractive methods to approximate
the optimal value function.
To that end, we draw on the choice-based deterministic linear programming model (CDLP) as
presented by Miranda Bront et al. (2009). CDLP under the MNL choice model can be used in a
mixed fare environment if overlapping consideration sets are allowed. We extended other approaches
to allow overlapping consideration sets in Meissner and Strauss (2009), and these approximations
could likewise be used to optimize in a mixed fare environment. We stick to the simpler CDLP for
the sake of clear illustration of the main ideas; the extension of the aﬃne or the time- and inventory-
sensitive approach can be done analogously. Let us deﬁne the expected revenue from oﬀering set S
by R(S):=
P
j∈S fjPj(S), the expected consumption of resource i by Qi(S):=
P
j∈S aijPj(S), and
Q(S):=[Q1(S),...,Qm(S)]T. The modiﬁed CDLP is given by
zCDLP =max
X
S⊂N:|S∩Ui|≤1,∀i
λR(S)t(S)
X
S⊂N:|S∩Ui|≤1,∀i
λQ(S)t(S)≤c,
X
S⊂N:|S∩Ui|≤1,∀i
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t(S)≥ 0, ∀S ⊂N :|S ∩Ui|≤1,∀i.
The real-valued variables t(S) represent the total length of time that product set S should be
oﬀered; under the assumption of time-homogeneous arrivals and choice probabilities, only total
duration is of importance and not when it should be oﬀered. Expected resource consumption is
constrained by capacity vector c, and we can only oﬀer products throughout the length τ of the
booking horizon. CDLP is identical to the one considered in Miranda Bront et al. (2009), the
only necessary adjustment relates to the fact that we may oﬀer at most one price point for each
unrestricted fare at a time.
CDLP can be solved via column generation and yields the optimal dual values π∗
i to the capacity
constraints as static estimates for the marginal opportunity cost of each resource i. With this
information one could deﬁne the approximation Vt(x)≈
P
iπ∗
ixk, but since it is static, we choose the
dynamic programming decomposition by the ﬂight legs to reﬁne the value function approximation
and to introduce time- and capacity-dependence as proposed by Liu and van Ryzin (2008). The
network is decomposed into single resource problems and the value function is approximated by
Vt(x)≈ V i
t (xi)+
P
k =iπ∗
kxk, where V i
t (xi) is computed by the single resource dynamic program
V
i
t (xi)= max
S⊆N:|S∩Uk|≤1,∀k
X
j∈S
λPj(S)
￿
fj −
￿
V
i
t+1(xi)−V
i
t+1(xi −1)−π
∗
i
￿
aij
−
X
k∈Aj
π
∗
k
￿
+V
i
t+1(xi), ∀t,∀xi ≥1,
with V i
τ+1(xi) = 0 for all xi and V i
t (0) = 0 for all t on the boundary. Once we have obtained all
functions V i
t ( ), we approximate the value function with Vt(x)≈
Pm
i=1V i
t (xi).
The policy—we refer to it as D-CDLP—relies on this estimate of the value function and seeks
to maximize the (approximately) displacement adjusted revenue within the given time period by
max
S⊂N(x):|S∩Ui|≤1,∀i
￿X
j∈S
λPj(S)
￿
fj −
X
i
∆V
i
t+1aij
￿
￿
, (1)
where ∆V i
t+1 := V i
t+1(xi) − V i
t+1(xi − 1) is the marginal value of resource i in time t + 1. The
problem (1) has a similar structure like the column pricing problems that arise in solving CDLP,
hence the problem can again be solved either by a mixed integer linear program or be tackled by
a greedy heuristic.
5. Pricing Structure Optimization
So far, the extension of CDLP to a mixed fare environment was straightforward and involved essen-
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that we are given a ﬁnite number of price points at which an unrestricted fare can be oﬀered;
for example, we deﬁne prices on a uniform grid within certain reasonable upper and lower price
bounds, and let the policy decide which price we should use in a given time period. In practice,
however, the number of potential price points is often limited by the technical constraints of the
booking system. Consequently, a natural question to ask is which price points out of a ﬁnite set
would be the best to include in our pricing structure given a constraint on the total number of
price points per unrestricted fare. By pricing structure we mean the price points that the dynamic
policy will choose from in the booking process.
This section proposes methods that seek to optimize the pricing structure. We ﬁrst consider
a dynamic programming formulation that represents an optimal policy and is of interest from a
theoretical point of view, but that is again computationally intractable. For practical purposes, we
propose a heuristic in the form of a linear mixed integer program that provides an upper bound
on the optimal expected revenue over all feasible pricing structures.
5.1. Dynamic Programming Formulation
Let us denote the maximum expected revenue to be obtained over time period t up to the end of
the booking horizon when we have capacity x still uncommitted by ˜ V (t,x,y), where y is a binary
vector that indicates whether a price point j ∈ U of an unrestricted fare is in the price structure,
that is, yj = 1 in this case. For given limit Li on each unrestricted fare i, the set S of all feasible
states is deﬁned by
S :=
￿
(t,x,y):∀t,x and
X
j∈Ui
yj ≤Li, ∀i
￿
.
Let us deﬁne the transition function for the y state—that means, the function that indicates how
y changes from one stage of the dynamic program to the next—for all j ∈U by
ˆ yj(S,y):=
(
yj, if j / ∈ S,
1, if j ∈ S.
The dynamic program that can determine the optimal price points to pre-select is then:
˜ V (t,x,y)= max
S⊂N(x):|S∩Ui|≤1∀i
￿X
j∈S
λPj(S)
h
fj +V
￿
t+1,x−Aj, ˆ y(S,y)
￿i
+
￿
1−λ+λP0(S)
￿
V
￿
t+1,x, ˆ y(S,y)
￿￿
, ∀(t,x,y)∈S, (2)
˜ V (t,0,y)=0, ∀(t,0,y)∈S,
˜ V (τ +1,x,y) =0, ∀(τ +1,x,y)∈ S,
˜ V (t,x,y)=−∞, ∀(t,x,y) / ∈S.12 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
We formulate the dynamic program in a more general way in that it is permitted to oﬀer new price
points during the time horizon. We could theoretically identify the optimal pre-selected pricing
structure by identifying a vector y that maximizes ˜ V (1,c,y) such that, for any unrestricted fare
i, we are only using Li price points. Direct solution is again computationally intractable. The
following Lemma conﬁrms the intuitive result that up-front commitment to speciﬁc price points
potentially reduces the expected revenue compared to a situation where we only need to commit
to price points once we oﬀer them.
Lemma 1 For any y1, y2 ∈{0,1}|U| with y1   y2, it holds that
˜ V (t,x,y
1)≥ ˜ V (t,x,y
2) for all t and x.
Proof. Let y1, y2 ∈{0,1}|U| with y1  y2. It is clear from the boundary condition that ˜ V (t,x,y1)≥
˜ V (t,x,y2) holds for t=τ +1 since the only possible values are either both 0 in the case that y1 and
y2 are feasible, both −∞ in case that both are infeasible or ˜ V (t,x,y1)=0 and ˜ V (t,x,y2)=−∞ in
case that only y2 is infeasible.
Suppose now t≤ τ and the assertion holds for t+1. For any oﬀer set S we have ˆ y(S,y1)  ˆ y(S,y2)
by deﬁnition of the transition function ˆ y. It follows that
˜ V (t+1,x−Aj, ˆ y(S,y
1))≥ ˜ V (t+1,x−Aj, ˆ y(S,y
2))
and
˜ V (t+1,x,ˆ y(S,y
1))≥ ˜ V (t+1,x, ˆ y(S,y
2)).
Using the Bellman equation (2) for ˜ V (t,x,y1) and exploiting the latter inequalities yields the
desired result. ￿
Essentially, by ﬁxing the price points at the outset we restrict our pricing ﬂexibility over the
remaining time horizon. The result indicates that it would be beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm to re-optimize
their price structure to account for the demand information that has become available in the
meantime. While it might not be possible to implement more than a certain number of price points
in a booking system, it might be possible to change the price points available in the system at least
once or twice during the booking horizon.
5.2. Linear Programming Approach
The main idea for the construction of a heuristic to tackle the dynamic program (2) is that the
objective of CDLP is an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue for a ﬁxed pricing structure,
and therefore can be used as a measure of its quality. Though we do not know how close the boundMeissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 13
is to the optimal value, we still can expect from numerical observations that an increase in the
bound reﬂects an increase in optimal expected revenue. Essentially, we maximize this upper bound
over all feasible price point combinations. This idea gives rise to the following linear mixed integer
program, where N :={S ⊂ N :|S ∩Ui|≤1,∀i}:
(MIP) max
t,z
X
S∈N
λR(S)t(S) (3)
X
S∈N
t(S)=τ, (4)
X
S∈N
λQ(S)t(S)≤ c, (5)
X
j∈Uk
zj =Li, ∀i, (6)
X
S∈N:j∈S
t(S)≤τzj, ∀j ∈U, (7)
zj ∈{0,1}, ∀j ∈U, (8)
t(S)≥0, ∀S ∈N. (9)
The linear program (3)–(5), (9) is identical to the original CDLP. We introduced an additional
binary variable zj for every price point j ∈ U of any unrestricted fare which indicates whether j is
added to the pricing structure or not. Constraint (6) forces the total number of used price points
to be equal to the prescribed limit for the corresponding unrestricted fare i, and constraints (7)
ensure that zj =1 as soon as price point j is being used for any positive amount of time; note that
P
S⊂N:j∈S t(S) represents the overall time that j is oﬀered throughout the booking horizon.
We propose to solve (MIP) by column generation for (mixed) integer programming. We use a
column pricing problem that identiﬁes a new improving column based on dual variables obtained
from the restricted master problem (RMP). Initially generating Li columns corresponding to zj
for some j ∈ Ui, along with the column corresponding to t(∅), ensures a feasible starting point.
There are many possible ways of solving (MIP), for example, branch and price strategies as
described in Barnhart et al. (1998). We use a heuristic approach that involves ﬁrst solving the
linear programming relaxation of the initial RMP via column generation; details of the approach
used in our numerical experiments are given in Section 5.3.
Let us have a closer look at the column pricing problem: we consider the dual of the relaxation
of (MIP) and derive the reduced cost formula for the column corresponding to t(S); generating
columns corresponding to zj can be done analogously. In our experiments, we generate all columns
belonging to the variables zj at the outset so that we focus only on generating the t(S) columns.14 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
We associate Lagrangian multipliers σ, πi, µi, ξj and oj with the constraints (4), (5), (6), (7) and
zj ≤ 1 for all j. The dual is given by
min
σ,π,µ,ξ,o
τσ +c
Tπ +L
Tµ+
X
j∈Ui∀i
oj
λQ(S)
Tπ+σ +
X
j∈Ui∀i
ξj1{j∈S} ≥ λR(S), ∀S ∈N,
µk −τξj +oj ≥0, ∀j ∈U,
σ,µ free,π,ξ,o ≥0.
For any S ∈ N, the reduced cost of the column corresponding to t(S) is therefore
λR(S)−λQ(S)
Tπ−σ−
X
j∈Ui∀i
ξj1{j∈S}.
Starting from a pool of columns, we would like to know which column next to generate and to add
to the master problem. We select them in a greedy fashion by maximizing the reduced cost over
all feasible oﬀer sets, that is
max
u∈{0,1}n
X
j∈U
h￿
fj −A
T
j π
￿
λPj(u)−ξjuj
i
+
X
j∈R
￿
fj −A
T
j π
￿
λPj(u)−σ
X
j∈Ui
uj ≤1, ∀i. (10)
Constraints (10) ensure that each unrestricted fare can be oﬀered at most at one price point;
remember that this restriction was previously expressed by S ∈ N. The term λPj(u) stands for the
probability that a customer arrives and purchases product j if we oﬀer products as indicated by
the binary vector u, and is given by
λPj(u)=
X
l
λl
vljuj P
ι∈Cl vlιuι +vl0
,
as discussed earlier.
This column pricing problem can be reformulated as a mixed integer linear program or approx-
imately solved by using a greedy heuristic, as done for the CDLP by Miranda Bront et al. (2009)
in the presence of overlapping consideration sets.
An interesting feature of our approach is that it yields an estimate of the value of a price point
in the form of the Lagrangian multipliers ξj corresponding to the constraints (7). Suppose we have
an optimal solution (t,z) to (MIP), and zj =0 for some j. If ξj >0, increasing the right-hand side
of the constraint (7) by one time unit would enable us to oﬀer price point j for one time period
and increase our revenue by ξj. Therefore, we can interpret ξj as the marginal value of a priceMeissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 15
point with respect to time. We can also state an upper bound for the value of having the limit on
the number of price points of an unrestricted fare relaxed by 1: The dual value µi of constraint (6)
gives us the increase in revenue due to this enhanced ﬂexibility, however, it is an upper bound and
not the exact value of revenue increase because we consider the relaxed linear program.
So far, we assumed arrivals and customer preferences to be time-homogeneous. In reality, how-
ever, time-dependent purchase behavior has a great impact on which prices to oﬀer. As indicated
earlier, we can approach this more general situation by dividing the booking horizon into suﬃ-
ciently smaller parts where we can assume time-homogeneity. We illustrate how to optimize the
pricing structure in this case with the following example.
Example 1 For the sake of simplicity, suppose arrivals and preferences are homogenous through-
out the ﬁrst three quarters of the time horizon and then only change once, that is, we have Poisson
processes with rates λ1 and λ2 for the ﬁrst and second part of the booking horizon, respectively.
Likewise, expected revenue R1(S) and expected resource consumption Q1(S) change to R2(S) and
Q2(S) at time period (3/4)τ. The mixed integer linear problem is then:
max
t,z
X
S∈N
￿
λ1R1(S)t1(S)+λ2R2(S)t2(S)
￿
X
S∈N
t1(S)=
3
4
τ,
X
S∈N
t2(S)=
1
4
τ,
X
S∈N
λ1Q1(S)t1(S)≤c,
X
S∈N
λ2Q2(S)t2(S)≤c−
X
S∈N
λ1Q1(S)t1(S),
X
j∈Ui
zj =Li ∀i,
X
S∈N:j∈S
￿
t1(S)+t2(S)
￿
≤ τzj ∀j ∈U,
zj ∈{0,1} ∀j ∈U,
t1(S),t2(S)≥0 ∀S ∈ N.
Note that this problem is not considerably more diﬃcult to solve than (MIP) because there are only
m + 1 more constraints—the additional variables are acceptable since we use column generation
anyway. In fact, each additional division of a homogeneous time interval will result in additional
m+1 constraints. We conclude that incorporating time-dependence is possible, though the more
the booking horizon needs to be split up the more run time the computations will require.16 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
5.3. Numerical Results
In this section, we are more interested in how to choose a good pricing structure than how to
construct a good policy because the latter has been discussed in the recent literature already;
note that any policy based on MNL with overlapping consideration sets can be easily adapted
to mixed restricted / unrestricted fare environments. Therefore, we ﬁx the policy and investigate
the impact of altering the pricing structure. We use the dynamic programming decomposition
policy D-CDLP of Liu and van Ryzin (2008) for all simulations because it is a currently used
benchmark. Recently, other policies have been proposed that can achieve higher revenues at higher
computational expense, see, for example, Zhang and Adelman (2009), Kunnumkal and Topaloglu
(2008), Zhang (2009) or TISA as presented in Meissner and Strauss (2009). These approaches can
be combined with our pricing method with accordingly improved revenue results.
We test our new method for pricing structure optimization in mixed fare environments under
the D-CDLP policy on several problem instances that shall illustrate the method’s performance
with respect to quality and run-time. By quality we refer to the percentage improvement of mean
revenue due to pre-committing to the pricing structure derived from (MIP), as opposed to simply
choosing the number of allowed price points on an uniform grid over the prescribed price interval.
The latter, trivial choice is our benchmark method of choosing a pricing structure. The run-time
required to solve (MIP) calls for an investigation since we face a mixed integer program with a
number of columns that increases exponentially with the number of products.
All computations for solving (MIP) were done in Matlab with Cplex 11.2 using the Tomlab
interface on a 3GHz PC. In order to solve (MIP) for a given problem scenario, we generate the
columns corresponding to zj for all j ∈ U, t(∅), and t({j}) for all j ∈N to form the initial restricted
master problem (RMP). Next, we solve the linear programming relaxation of this initial RMP and
use the resulting dual values to generate a new improving column. We add the column, re-solve the
linear program and repeat the process until no more improving columns can be found (we stop when
maximal reduced cost is less than 10−4). The optimal objective value of this ﬁnal RMP represents
an upper bound on the optimal objective of (MIP). At this point, we reintroduce the constraints
“zj integer” for all j ∈ U to the RMP, and solve it with Cplex 11.2. We obtain a feasible mixed
integer solution whose objective forms a lower bound on the optimal objective value of (MIP).
We denote the percentage diﬀerence between this upper and lower bound as sub-optimality gap.
This heuristic works very well for our examples, in fact, optimality is reached in most cases. For
considerably larger networks, a heuristic similar to the one in Miranda Bront et al. (2009) should
be used for the column pricing to reduce the run time.Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 17
We test the pricing structure optimization on two network examples. The ﬁrst one is suﬃciently
small such that we can identify the optimal pricing structures, the second is a hub and spoke
network that counts among the largest test cases considered in recent work in the related ﬁelds,
see, for example, Miranda Bront et al. (2009) or Chaneton and Vulcano (2009).
A H B
Leg 1 Leg 2
Figure 1 Small network example.
5.3.1. Small Network Example We ﬁrst test the quality of price selection via (MIP) on
a network with two ﬂights only, as depicted in Figure 1. It is small enough to allow us to run
simulations for each feasible price combination, so that we can identify the optimal pricing structure
by full enumeration. In this example, we assume that the ﬁrm oﬀers an unrestricted fare U for
short-haul (direct) ﬂights and traditional fares for the long-haul (connecting) traﬃc with fare
classes Y, M and Q. For both direct ﬂights we have ﬁve potential price points; however, we assume
that we are limited to only three price points each that may form our price structure. Each origin-
destination combination has two segments associated with it, one with high and the other with
low price sensitivity. Restrictions on the traditional fares eﬀectively fence oﬀ the lower fares for the
connecting traﬃc, however, on the direct ﬂights business customers are able to buy down, resulting
in overlapping segments. We summarize the product and segment deﬁnitions in Table 1 and 2. In
the following, when we refer to a price point j = 3, for example, we mean the price point that is
described by the virtual product 3 in Table 1. The capacity of leg 1 and 2 is 50 and 70, respectively,
and we consider a time horizon of 1000 time periods.
For each direct ﬂight, there are 5!/(2!3!)=10 possible sets with three price points, so totally 100
price combinations in the network (note that restricted fares are always included in the pricing
structure). We do not need to consider subsets with less than three price points per direct ﬂight
since we may choose never to oﬀer an unrestricted fare at a certain price point. For each of the
100 pricing structures, we run simulations using the dynamic programming decomposition policy
D-CDLP based on CDLP’s dual values of the capacity constraints to obtain a close approximation
of the optimal expected revenue. The simulation is stopped once the relative error is less than
0.7% with 95% conﬁdence, which is usually reached after about 200 simulations of the booking
process for this problem. We report the results in Figure 2. They demonstrate that the upper18 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
Product Resources OD Class Fare
1 1 A → H U 100
2 1 ” U 120
3 1 ” U 140
4 1 ” U 160
5 1 ” U 180
6 2 H → B U 100
7 2 ” U 120
8 2 ” U 140
9 2 ” U 160
10 2 ” U 180
11 1,2 A → B Q 300
12 1,2 ” M 350
13 1,2 ” Y 500
Table 1 Product deﬁnitions for Small Network Example. “Resources” indicates the resources which the respective
product utilizes.
# Segment Consideration set Pref. vector λl (%) vl0
1 A → H, high price sensitivity {1,2,3} [6,4,2] 15 10
2 A → H, low price sensitivity {1,2,3,4,5} [5,4,3,2,1] 6 10
3 H → B, high price sensitivity {6,7,8} [6,4,2] 15 10
4 H → B, low price sensitivity {6,7,8,9,10} [5,4,3,2,1] 6 10
5 A → B, high price sensitivity {11,12} [5,3] 3 10
6 A → B, low price sensitivity {13} [5] 2 10
Table 2 Segments, consideration sets, preference values and arrival rates for Small Network Example.
bound provided by the CDLP can reﬂect the relative behavior of the simulated mean revenue
very well. This is encouraging because (MIP) essentially maximizes CDLP over all potential price
combinations subject to the price point limits. For this network our method proposes to use price
points {1,3,5} for leg 1 and {6,7,8} for leg 2. When looking up the 18 price combinations that
maximize the simulated mean revenue (listed in Table 3), we observe that this pricing structure is
among them. Therefore, in this simple example, an optimal pricing structure has been identiﬁed.
The corresponding mean revenue is 1.7% higher than choosing price points on a uniform grid (that
is, {1,3,5} on leg 1 and {6,8,10} on leg 2).
5.3.2. Hub & Spoke Network Our second network example is considerably larger, though
still small in comparison to realistic network instances. This is because testing choice-based network
RM optimization is considerably more computationally involved than under independent demand.
However, the Hub & Spoke network corresponds to the largest network example of some recent
publications including Miranda Bront et al. (2009). We solve (MIP) with our heuristic approach
for diﬀerent scenarios with respect to network capacity and number of price points, and analyzeMeissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 19
Pricing Structure # Leg 1 Leg 2
1 1 2 3 6 7 8
2 1 2 3 7 8 9
3 1 2 3 7 8 10
4 1 3 4 6 7 8
5 1 3 4 7 8 9
6 1 3 4 7 8 10
7 2 3 4 6 7 8
8 2 3 4 7 8 9
9 2 3 4 7 8 10
10 1 3 5 6 7 8
11 1 3 5 7 8 9
12 1 3 5 7 8 10
13 2 3 5 6 7 8
14 2 3 5 7 8 9
15 2 3 5 7 8 10
16 3 4 5 6 7 8
17 3 4 5 7 8 9
18 3 4 5 7 8 10
Table 3 List of all pricing structures that maximize simulated mean revenue. The restricted products are always
in the structure and therefore have been omitted. Structure 10 is the one identiﬁed by (MIP).
Segment Prices Preferences
ATLBOS/BOSATL H [310,290,95,69] [6,7,9,10]
ATLBOS/BOSATL L [95,69] [8,10]
ATLLAX/LAXATL H [455,391,142,122] [5,6,9,10]
ATLLAX/LAXATL L [142,122] [9,10]]
ATLMIA/MIAATL H [280,209,94,59] [5,5,10,10]
ATLMIA/MIAATL L [94,59] [8,10]
ATLSAV/SAVATL H [159,140,64,49] [4,5,8,9]
ATLSAV/SAVATL L [64,49] [7,10]
Table 4 Preference values at given prices that were used for inter- or extrapolation over the respective uniform
price grid.
run time and sub-optimality gaps. For each scenario, we evaluate the resulting pricing structure
by means of simulation and compare them to the benchmark method.
Solving (MIP) is not a trivial task since it is a mixed integer program with 1 + 2m + |U|
constraints and an exponentially growing number of variables, where m is the number of ﬂight
legs and |U| is the total number of price points in the network belonging to unrestricted fares.
We assume that there is exactly one unrestricted fare for each direct ﬂight that is to be priced at
one out of p price points, giving a total of |U| = mp price points, while the airline can maintain
restrictions on connecting traﬃc.
The Hub & Spoke Network example consists of eight ﬂights as depicted in Figure 3, each with20 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
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Figure 2 CDLP-based upper bounds on optimal expected revenue and simulated mean revenue results for each
of the 100 possible pricing structures with three price points. Simulations used D-CDLP policy. Results
indicate that maximising the upper bound over all pricing structures can identify good ones.
O-D Market Legs Revenue
Y M B Q U
BOSLAX/LAXBOS 4,2/1,3 575 380 159 139 -
BOSMIA/MIABOS 4,7/8,3 403 314 124 89 -
BOSSAV/SAVBOS 4,5/6,3 319 250 109 69 -
LAXMIA/MIALAX 1,7/8,2 477 239 139 119 -
LAXSAV/SAVLAX 1,5/6,2 502 450 154 134 -
MIASAV/SAVMIA 8,5/6,7 226 168 84 59 -
ATLBOS/BOSATL 3/4 - - - - [69,310]
ATLLAX/LAXATL 2/1 - - - - [122,455]
ATLMIA/MIAATL 7/8 - - - - [59,280]
ATLSAV/SAVATL 5/6 - - - - [49,159]
Table 5 Product deﬁnitions for the Hub & Spoke Network Example.
capacity 200 that we scale up or down with a parameter
α ∈{0.6,0.8,1,1.2}
to account for diﬀerent load factors. Products are deﬁned in Table 5 in the appendix: There are 48
restricted fares for connecting traﬃc, and one unrestricted fare for each direct ﬂight. For example,Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 21
Segment Cl vl λl
BOSLAX H {1,2,3,4} {5,5,7,10} 0.01
BOSLAX L {3,4} {9.10} 0.032
LAXBOS H {5,6,7,8} {5,5,7,10} 0.01
LAXBOS L {7,8} {9,10} 0.032
BOSMIA H {9,10,11,12} {6,7,10,10} 0.008
BOSMIA L {11,12} {8,10} 0.03
MIABOS H {13,14,15,16} {6,7,10,10} 0.008
MIABOS L {15,16} {8,10} 0.03
BOSSAV H {17,18,19,20} {5,6,9,10} 0.01
BOSSAV L {19,20} {8,10} 0.035
SAVBOS H {21,22,23,24} {5,6,9,10} 0.01
SAVBOS L {23,24} {8,10} 0.035
LAXMIA H {25,26,27,28} {5,6,10,10} 0.012
LAXMIA L {27,28} {9,10} 0.028
MIALAX H {29,30,31,32} {5,6,10,10} 0.012
MIALAX L {31,32} {9,10} 0.028
LAXSAV H {33,34,35,36} {6,7,10,10} 0.016
LAXSAV L {35,36} {9,10} 0.03
SAVLAX H {37,38,39,40} {6,7,10,10} 0.016
SAVLAX L {39,40} {9,10} 0.03
MIASAV H {41,42,43,44} {6,7,8,10} 0.01
MIASAV L {43,44} {9,10} 0.025
SAVMIA H {45,46,47,48} {6,7,8,10} 0.01
SAVMIA L {47,48} {9.10} 0.025
ATLBOS H {49,...,48+p} interp 0.015
ATLBOS L {49,...,48+p} interp 0.035
BOSATL H {49+p,...,48+2p} interp 0.015
BOSATL L {49+p,...,48+2p} interp 0.035
ATLLAX H {49+2p,...,48+3p} interp 0.01
ATLLAX L {49+2p,...,48+3p} interp 0.04
LAXATL H {49+3p,...,48+4p} interp 0.01
LAXATL L {49+3p,...,48+4p} interp 0.04
ATLMIA H {49+4p,...,48+5p} interp 0.012
ATLMIA L {49+4p,...,48+5p} interp 0.035
MIAATL H {49+5p,...,48+6p} interp 0.012
MIAATL L {49+5p,...,48+6p} interp 0.035
ATLSAV H {49+6p,...,48+7p} interp 0.01
ATLSAV L {49+6p,...,48+7p} interp 0.03
SAVATL H {49+7p,...,48+8p} interp 0.01
SAVATL L {49+7p,...,48+8p} interp 0.03
Table 6 Segments, consideration sets, preference values and arrival rates for the Hub & Spoke Network Example.
p is the number of potential price points per leg, interp indicates that the preference values have been
inter- or extrapolated based on the data in Table 4. Preference for non-purchase vl0 is 5 for all H
segments, and 10 for all L segments.22 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
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Figure 3 Hub & Spoke Network example.
Product 1 is a ticket BOS to LAX in class Y for $575 using legs 2 and 4, Product 4 is BOS
to LAX in class Q for $139 and Product 5 is LAX to BOS in class Y using legs 1 and 3. The
restricted products are identical to those in Example 3 in Miranda Bront et al. (2009), for the
products on direct ﬂights, however, we substituted in unrestricted fares that shall be priced at one
out of maximal Li = 4 price points for all legs i. We choose this limit because in the restricted
environment we have four fare classes, so for technical reasons (regarding the booking system),
there might be only four “price slots” available to which we need to commit at the beginning of the
booking horizon. The model (MIP) needs to choose the best four prices out of a set of p prices for
each ﬂight on a uniform grid deﬁned over the interval given in Table 5. For example, the candidate
price points for ATLBOS are {69,69+∆,...,310} with the price step ∆=(310−69)/(p−1).
We have two customer segments per origin-destination combination, a high-yield (H) and a low-
yield (L) one, the former being less price sensitive than the latter. Preference values for the prices
of Y, M, Q and B class similar to those in Miranda Bront et al. (2009) were used to inter- and
extrapolate those on the uniform grid with cubic splines, the related information being given in
Table 6 and 4. For example, the segment ATLBOS H considers prices between $69 and $310. The
benchmark method would select four price points with uniform distance to each other, namely
{69,149.33,229.67,310}. Cubic spline interpolation as mentioned above yields {10,8.26,8.27,6} as
corresponding preference values.
The underlying rationale is that customers increasingly ignore restrictions, particularly on short-
haul ﬂights, and focus on price instead. See Boyd and Kallesen (2004), for example. Hence we
interpret the preference values in the restricted context as being purely motivated by price, giving
rise to the idea of extrapolation to other price points to obtain a mixed fare environment under
similar customer behavior.Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 23
p=4 p=8 p=16 p=32
α M(s) P(s) #GC M(s) P(s) #GC M(s) P(s) #GC M(s) P(s) #GC
0.6 0.9 68.5 101 0.4 41.8 49 0.5 77.4 49 0.8 227.4 60
0.8 0.4 31.4 45 0.3 39.7 38 0.7 94.3 53 1.4 264.5 57
1.0 0.3 22.0 36 0.2 14.2 16 0.3 34.9 23 0.3 70.0 20
1.2 0.1 7.5 12 0.0 3.2 3 0.1 13.5 9 0.1 29.5 9
Table 7 CPU time for Hub & Spoke Network Example. p number of prices points from which only four are
chosen, α scaling parameter of the ﬂight capacities, M(s) time spent on solving Master problems in
seconds, P(s) time spent on pricing columns in seconds, #GC number of generated columns.
p=4 p=8 p=16 p=32
α UB OptGap UB OptGap UB OptGap UB OptGap
0.6 126,552 0.000 127,224 0.000 127,500 0.000 127,510 0.000
0.8 138,486 0.000 139,189 0.000 139,571 0.000 139,619 0.000
1.0 144,437 0.000 145,257 0.000 145,359 0.000 145,410 0.000
1.2 145,170 0.000 146,247 0.000 146,256 0.000 146,309 0.000
Table 8 Upper bounds on (MIP) and sub-optimality gaps of the identiﬁed mixed integer solutions. α scaling
parameter of the ﬂight capacities, UB upper bound, OptGap percentage optimality gap.
p=4 p=8 p=16 p=32
α MR ±% LF MR ±% LF MR ±% LF MR ±% LF ∆%
0.6 124,764 0.30 0.97 125,299 0.28 0.97 125,580 0.29 0.97 125,589 0.29 0.97 0.66
0.8 136,850 0.26 0.97 137,439 0.26 0.97 137,803 0.26 0.96 137,730 0.26 0.97 0.64
1.0 143,352 0.26 0.93 144,239 0.25 0.92 144,351 0.25 0.92 144,407 0.25 0.92 0.74
1.2 144,950 0.27 0.83 146,012 0.26 0.83 146,035 0.26 0.82 146,086 0.26 0.82 0.78
Table 9 Simulation results for Hub & Spoke Network Example using policy D-CDLP. p number of prices points
from which only four are chosen, α scaling parameter of the ﬂight capacities, MR mean revenue, ±%
percentage relative error with 95% conﬁdence, LF empirical load factor, ∆% percentage improvement
of MR for p= 32 relative to MR for p = 4.
Despite the fact that our method can also be used to compare policies in restricted versus mixed
fare environments, our purpose is to illustrate the performanceof the pricing structureoptimization.
The tests were carried out under the assumption that we seek to identify four price points out of a
uniform grid with p∈{4,8,16,32} candidates for each direct ﬂight simultaneously. For each p, we
vary the scaling parameter α to reﬂect diﬀerent load factors. Note that the case p=4 corresponds
to the benchmark method as the pricing structure is trivial in this case. Nevertheless we solve
(MIP) for this case as well because we require information on the dual variables for the dynamic
programming decomposition.
We report CPU times for solving the restricted master problems (RMP) and column pricing
problems associated (MIP) along with the number of generated columns in Table 7. Run times24 Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization
are very small for the cases of higher capacity (α∈ {1,1.2}) since the capacity is less constraining.
But even for the more interesting cases of tight capacity it took in the worst scenario 265 seconds
to solve (MIP). Cplex generally required less than a second to ﬁnd a mixed integer solution to
the ﬁnal RMP.
Table 8 reports the upper bounds on (MIP) obtained from solving the linear programming
relaxation of (MIP), and the corresponding percentage optimality gap. In all cases, an optimal
solution has been identiﬁed. The bounds are also upper bounds on the optimal expected revenue;
this follows from the fact that the optimal objective of CDLP represents an upper bound for a
ﬁxed pricing structure.
The simulated mean revenues in Table 9 are each based on a sample of 500 demand streams. The
column corresponding to p=4 represents the benchmark method of choosing the 4 price points for
each unrestricted fare simply to have uniform distance to each other. Compared to using (MIP)
to select 4 price points out of p=32 candidates on a uniform grid over the same price interval, we
observe in all cases signiﬁcant improvements of 0.7–0.8%.
6. Conclusion
We propose a choice-based network revenue management model that can be used to optimize the
pricing structure in unrestricted or mixed restricted/unrestricted fare environments. In addition,
the model provides upper bounds on the value of an additional price point. Some numerical exper-
iments indicate that revenue improvements may be gained. An optimal solution can be obtained
by a dynamic programming formulation which, though being computationally intractable, is of
theoretical interest. For example, we can derive the insight from it that late commitment to price
points can potentially increase expected revenues. If we can re-deﬁne price points at some time
during the booking horizon, this could be exploited by resolving our proposed model, and changing
the pricing structure accordingly. Naturally, this will be constrained by the cost of price changes
and technical obstacles.
As for future research, our model could be used to perform simulation studies to examine under
which circumstances entirely unrestricted product structures are to be preferred over mixed ones,
or how the pricing structure changes in response to changes in the customers’ purchase behavior.
The pre-selection of price points can also be paired with recent achievements in tightening the
upper bound on the optimal expected revenue, see, for example, Talluri (2008). Such an approach
can be expected to yield potentially better results because we use the upper bound as the objective
to maximize over all possible pricing structures, and accordingly a tighter bound should yield a
more accurate objective.Meissner and Strauss: Pricing Structure Optimization 25
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